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SWIFT TO ERIE/YORK, HANNA AND BEYOND:
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR
A MAJOR PROBLEM OF
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
E. Blythe Stason, Jr. *
I. Introduction
A. Historical Background
Diversity jurisdiction of the United States District Courts is a leading
feature of the American constitutional federation. Authorized by Article
III of the Constitution' and early implemented by Congressional enact-
ment,2 diversity jurisdiction attempted to protect nonresident litigants in
state courts from the sectional prejudice that was prevalent at the time. "Di-
versity courts" 3 are required by the Rules of Decision Act to apply state
law.4 This arrangement immediately created serious difficulties. One was
whether diversity courts should apply state or federal "procedural" 5 law.
The more serious problem of characterization of state law as "substantive"
or "procedural" did not arise until 1938. That year marked the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6 and the landmark decision of
*Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary. A.B. 1946; M.A. 1947; LL.B. 1956, University of Michigan; LL.M.
1957, Harvard.
' "The judicial power [of the United States] shall extend ... to Controversies between
citizens of different States . . ." U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964) (corresponds to Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12,
1 Stat. 79) provides for original diversity jurisdiction, and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a)(1964) provides for such jurisdiction by removal, where the principal amount in
dispute is valued at $10,000 or more.
3 This terminology is not only convenient as shorthand, but expressive of the tem-
porary hybridization of District Courts that occurs when they take jurisdiction
of causes arising under state law.
4 The Rules of Decision Act says: "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
5 Owing to the uncertain meaning of the words "substantive" and "procedural", par-
ticularly when used in diversity matters, they will be enclosed in quotation marks
as a warning to handle them with discretion.
6 See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). That statute, in pertinent part,
provides: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general
rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions. Such rules
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ..." [Italics added.]
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Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.7 There the Supreme Court decided that the
Constitution requires diversity courts to apply "substantive" state law,
whether statute or judicial opinion. Pre-Erie courts were governed by the
mandate of Swift v. TysonS that the words "law of the several states" 9
in the Rules of Decision Act apply to state statutes. In matters of general
import diversity courts were free to apply federal common law to "substan-
tive" questions of more than local significance and to disregard state
decisional law.
The primary justification for the Swift rule was that it would establish
a uniform body of law in the diversity courts (and hopefully in the state
courts). Naturally enough, this hope was never realized in the state courts
which continued to follow the decisional law of their own state. The Swift
rule created a federal common law that frequently differed from state law.
Some litigants, preferring federal law, fabricated diversity jurisdiction in
order to gain access to the federal courts. Those able to obtain diversity
jurisdiction had a choice of "substantive" law not open to local adver-
saries. Such "forum shopping" generated much well-deserved criticism.1l
Despite its drawbacks and the failure of its major purpose, the Swift
rule remained the law for nearly a century. It declined in force as much
of the area of its operation came to be regulated by state statute.
Swift was overruled on constitutional grounds in Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins."1 Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, declared that
diversity courts must apply state law to "substantive" issues. He said:
The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or limiting
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. . . .(T)he unconstitutionality of
the course pursued has now been made clear....
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
federal concern. 12 There is no federal general common law. Con-
gress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law ap-
7 Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). [Hereinafter cited as Erie]
S41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)
9 Note 4 supra.
10 See Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928). The outraged dissent in that case by Mr. Justice Holmes was an impor-
tant part of the foundation for overruling Swift in Erie.
11 Erie, supra note 7.
12 Mr. Justice Brandeis here refers to the words "laws of the several states" as used
in the Rules of Decision Act, Note 4 supra, to govern diversity litigation. These
words were deemed by the Court in Swift v. Tyson to refer only to state statutes
where matters of general significance were concerned. Despite recent judicial
developments, see text accompanying notes 48-76, casting doubt on the meaning
of Erie today, this Erie interpretation remains good law. C.I.R. v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) and cases cited therein.
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plicable in a state whether they be local in the nature or 'general'.13
[Italics added]
The Erie a rule that diversity courts are constitutionally required14 to
apply state law to issues found "substantive", combined with applicability
of the concurrently created Federal Rules except where they are likely to
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive (state-created) right,"' 5 posed
a fundamental problem: What test shall courts use in determining whether
a given issue is "substantive" or "procedural"? Characterization, 6 of these
two words in the traditional conflict of laws context has been difficult;
their meaning in diversity cases has proven impossible to establish. The
task of diversity courts is further complicated by the natural tendency of
judges to use each of these very familiar terms in its orthodox sense.1 7
The greatest difficulty of all in diversity characterization is caused by the
sensitivity of the political area involved-the area where state and
federal constitutional powers abut, and where the relative powers of state
and nation are ill defined. The courts have had to feel their way in this
touchy situation, deciding each case without adequate guidance from the
past and simultaneously attempting to establish guideposts for the future.
At best these attempts have proved only partially successful. Above them
all looms Erie, towering like a rock in the swirling fog and withstanding
all attack by its strength and indistinctness.S
B. Purposes of this Article
There are four purposes of this article: First, to expose more fully the
nature and dimensions of the difficult problem of determining whether a
13 Erie, supra note 7, at 77-78.
14 Many, including Mr. Justice Reed in his partially concurring opinion in Erie, 304
U.S. at 90-92, believed the constitutional language to have been unnecessary.
See Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie v. Hanna, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 377, 387 n. 34. For criticism of the author's acceptance of Erie's
constitutional foundation, see Editorial Comment by Professor Keeffe in 53
A.B.A.J. 865 (1967). As the constitutional force of Erie has been widely ac-
cepted for nearly thirty years, further discussion of that issue seems inappropriate.
15 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). [Italics added.]
16 "Characterization" is the conflict-of-laws term for identifying the legal category,
e.g., contracts v. tort; "substance" v. "procedure" - for a given issue or law.
Accordingly, characterization involved in this discussion will be termed "diversity
characterization." Regarding the difficulty of characterizing as "substantive" or
"procedural," see the listing of eight separate purposes for "substance-procedure"
characterization in Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws,
42 YALE L. J. 333, 341-7 (1933).
17 To illustrate the inappropriateness of such use, see the author's listing, text accom-
panying notes 79-90, infra, of several legal issues deemed "procedural" in inter-
state conflict of laws but either occasionally or universally found to be
"substantive" in diversity matters.
is This comment is intended not as criticism of Erie qua decision, but as a reminder




particular rule is "substantive" or "procedural"; Second, to discuss the
various judicial attempts to solve it; Third, to show the shortcomings of
those attempts, as manifested in both established doctrine and current fed-
eral judicial opinions; and, Fourth, to propose some solutions.
It should be made clear that we are involved here with a question of
allocating power within our federal union. Diversity characterization func-
tions as an unintended device allocating power between state and federal
judiciaries. The difficulties inherent in our basic problem are magnified
because feelings run high in this area, and opinions differ widely. The
author of this article is not a partisan of either "states' rights" or central-
ization of power in the federal government. An allocation of power was
made by the framers of the Constitution nearly two hundred years ago,
and the durability of their product attests to the wisdom of their effort.
Circumstances have changed radically since then, and corresponding
changes in power allocation are probably needed now. The author be-
lieves that power should be allocated to state or nation according to cur-
rent needs and relative capabilities. Some alteration by judicial "legisla-
tion" is both inevitable and desirable. It is believed, however, that most of
the required change should be made in the authorized manner - with the
combined consent of the governed and those politically responsible to
them, and not by politically unresponsive judges.
11. Development of Diversity Jurisdiction:
The Four Stages of Erie
A. Introduction
In order to understand the diversity characterization doctrine that has
been established since Erie, the double constitutional base of that case
should be reviewed. Erie stated that Swift v. Tyson was unconstitutional
in two ways: it had (1) deprived state court litigants of equal protection
of the laws by allowing litigants with similar claims in diversity cases a
choice of "substantive" law, and (2) invaded powers reserved to the states
by the Tenth Amendment, by prescribing a federal general common law
for state-created causes of action ungoverned by state statute. It should be
noted here that the Erie Court said nothing about "forum-shopping" by
name, thus indicating a belief that this evil was a result of Swift's uncon-
stitutionality rather than a cause.
As with other important and disputed constitutional pronouncements, a
handful of leading judicial opinions mark the principle stages of Erie's
career. Most of these are well known to practicing lawyers and scholars
alike; hence, no attempt will be made to discuss them individually in de-
tail. Each will be briefly mentioned, however, to trace the post-Erie course
of diversity characterization, in order to show its principle features and
[Vol. 1: 1
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present position. There are four overlapping but distinct stages in the
development of that characterization: extension, clarification, limitation
and partial negation.
B. Extension of Diversity Characterization under Erie
One week after the Erie decision Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance
Co.19 stated that Erie governs diversity suits in equity.2 0 Three years later,
in Griffin v. McCoach,2 1 the Court applied Erie uniformity2 2 to forum-
state public policy. This extension was quite significant as it established the
basis for the important "policy-balance" approach that began to appear
shortly thereafter and now plays an important part in diversity characteri-
zation. The same year, Erie uniformity was extended in Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electrical Mfg. Co.23 to state conflict of law rules.
In contrast with these two extensions of Erie is Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co.24 There the Court characterized as "procedural" the issue of whether
the plaintiff in a tort action can be required to take a physical examina-
tion as provided in Federal Rules 35 and 37. Speaking through Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts, the Court first stated that the Federal Rules are "procedural"
per se for diversity purposes. 25 It then enunciated its diversity character-
ization test, saying:
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure- the ju-
dicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substan-
tive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard
or infraction of them.2 6
19 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
20 Suits in equity were not covered by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652,
in 1938; it then applied only to "trials at common law", the Act has since been
amended to govern all "civil actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
21313 U.S. 498 (1941).
22 One of the Erie Court's major purposes in holding that the Rules of Decision Act
governs state judicial law as well as state statutes, was to ensure as far as
possible that the disposition of any given case would be the same in the
diversity court as it would have been in its proper state court. The Court sought
to achieve this uniformity by requiring diversity courts to apply state "substan-
tive" law, in order to eliminate the unconstitutional invasion of state reserved
powers and the infringement of non-diverse parties' constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws that prevailed under Swift v. Tyson. It will therefore be
called "Erie uniformity."
23 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
24312 U.S. 1 (1941).
25 Id. at 11. See also, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965). [Hereinafter
cited as Hanna]
26312 U.S. at 14. The Court in effect begged the question, implying a rigid, excep-
tionless belief that the judicial processes for enforcing legal rights can never have
any "substantive" effect recognizable as such in the context of diversity jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, the Court's definition of "substantive" is circular; it essentially
defines the word in terms of itself.
April 1968]
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In 1945, the Supreme Court extended Erie uniformity to state statutes
of limitation. 2 7 It did the same for state "door-closing" statutes in 194728
and 1949;29 for state bond-posting requirements for shareholders' deriva-
tive actions;30 for tolling provisions of state statutes of limitational in
1949; for the validity of contract arbitration clauses 3 2 in 1956.
C. Clarification of Diversity Characterization under Erie:
Creation of Standards
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court was attempting to establish a reliable
test for Erie characterization. The Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 33
went far toward attaining that goal. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter remarked that ordinary meanings of the word "substantive"
are unsuitable for use in diversity matters. He then continued:
The question is . ..whether such statutory limitation is a matter of
substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely,
does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court
to disregard a law of a state that would be controlling in an action
upon the same claim by the same parties in a State Court?3 4
The intent of Erie, he declared, was to insure that in all diversity cases
.. the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan-
tially the same ...as it would be if tried in a state court."3 5
The Court thus enunciated what is now called the "outcome test" for
determining substantive law in the Erie sense.3 6 After the York decision,
the outcome test was the principle instrument used by the Supreme Court
in its rapid extension of Erie. That test has come to be regarded as an
essential part of the Erie doctrine, which is sometimes referred to as
"Erie/York."
D. Limitation of Erie/York: Byrd v. Blue Ridge
The outcome test is a sensible and easily understood guide for distin-
guishing between "substance" and "procedure" in diversity cases. It had
27 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). [Hereinafter cited as York]
28 Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
29 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
30 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
31 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). See note 50
infra.
32 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
33 York, supra note 27, and accompanying text.
34 Id. at 109.
35 Id. at 109. [Italics added.]
36 York did not inaugurate the outcome test. It was employed by the First Circuit in
1940 in a sophisticated opinion by Judge Magruder, Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.
2d 754, 756 (1st Cir.1940).
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to be applied with some restraint, however, to forestall a natural ten-
dency to overuse. The Court first employed it to extend Erie rapidly and
rather widely, at the expense of federal law, including the Federal Rules.
The Court then began to doubt the wisdom of such extension. The first
sign of retreat was Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electrical Co-operative, Inc.3 7
In Byrd the Court had to decide whether the defendant's tort immunity
under the state statute must be decided by the judge, according to forum-
state law, or by the jury, as required by federal law. The Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brennan, agreed that a jury might well be "outcome
determinative" in the York sense. It then said that in cases where, as
here, the rule in question is neither the source of state-created rights nor
"bound up" with such rights, but is merely the "form or mode" for en-
forcing them, the outcome test requires application of state law only if the
policy upon which it is based outweighs that behind the contrary federal
law. The Court concluded that the federal policy was stronger and held
the outcome test is inapplicable.38 While unsatisfactory in some ways,3 9
the "policy-balance" test has come to be recognized by the Supreme Court
as a major part of its diversity characterization machinery. It has been
used to limit the outcome test in a number of cases, 40 and evolved in
accordance with the present centralist trend into the still more restrictive
position adopted in 1965 by the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer.4 1
E. Partial Negation of Erie/ York: Hanna v. Plumer
The recent Hanna decision is one of the most thought-provoking and
controversial of the Erie progeny. It represents the Court's first real at-
tempt to totemize Erie - to acknowledge its existence but deny what many
believe to be its essential meaning - and thereby to accomplish a partial
return to the Swift rule.
A personal injury action was brought against the administrator of a dece-
dent in a Massachusetts diversity court. Substituted service valid under
Federal Rule 4(d) (1), but void under Massachusetts law, was made on
the administrator. The facts of the case thus brought a Federal Rule into
square and unavoidable conflict with state law. 42 Speaking through Chief
37 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
3s The reader will note that Byrd does not qualify the outcome test, but implicitly
negates it instead. While that test was designed as a definition of "substantive"
for diversity purposes, the Byrd Court quietly declined to accept it as such, and
characterized the law in question in another, unspecified, way.
39 See the author's comments on Byrd in Choice of Law Within the Federal System:
Erie v. Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377, 392-4 (1967).
40 See, e.g., Monarch Insurance Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.1960); Jaftex
Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.1960) modified 320 F.2d
225 (2d Cir.1963).
41 Hanna, supra note 25.
42 Id. at 470. The Court said that this was the first such conflict. 380 U.S. at
472. But see, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949), where the Supreme Court applied the forum-state tolling provision of
April 19681
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Justice Warren, the Court said that the Rule must govern for two reasons.
First, application of the federal instead of the state service requirement
did not contravene the "twin aims" of Erie - to prevent inequitable ad-
ministration of the law and forum-shopping. Second, Erie is inapplicable
where the Federal Rules are concerned. The Court stated:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the ques-
tion facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided
Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule,
and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court,
and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor con-
stitutional restrictions. [Citations Omitted] For the constitutional pro-
vision foi a Federal-court system (augmented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules
governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn
includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure are rationally capable
of classification as either. [Citation Omitted]
Neither York nor the cases following it ever suggested that the rule
there laid down for coping with situations where no Federal Rule
applies is coextensive with the limitation on Congress to which Erie
had adverted. 43
Mr. Justice Harlan, in an excellent concurring opinion, agreed with the
Hanna result but took serious exception to its rationale. He objected in
particular to the Court's elevation of the Rules to a position of impregna-
bility where, because they have presumably been "rationally" classified as
"procedural" by those charged with their formulation and adoption, they
must always be applied regardless of their "substantive" impact.
As Justice Harlan pointed out, the Court cast doubt upon the position
of prior diversity characterization standards by declining to overrule or
even specifically limit any of the cases in which such standards had been
developed. It even declined to overrul Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
Warehouse Co.,4 4 the one case in which the Supreme Court had appar-
ently discarded a Federal Rule in favor of state law. By leaving these
landmark cases technically alive and in full health, yet effectively declaring
the applicable state statute of limitation, thereby barring an action which could
have proceeded had Federal Rule 3 been found applicable instead. There is some
question whether Hanna overruled Ragan sub silentio. Compare Sylvestri v.
Warner & Swasey Co., 244 F.Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) and text accompany-
ing note 49, infra., with Sylvester v. Messler 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir.1965),
cert. denied 382 U.S. 1011 (1966) and Groninger v. Davidson 364 F.2d 638
(8th Cir.1966).
43 Id. at 471-472.
44 See note 3 1 supra.
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that applicable Federal Rules must always prevail, the Court left diversity
characterization under Erie in a state of confusion and uncertainty. First,
it cast doubt upon Erie's meaning by referring to that case as having "twin
aims." The general view has been that Erie had but a single objective:
to require the same result in each diversity case that would have occurred
had its cause of action been brought in the forum-state court. Second,
the Court required application of the Federal Rules to issues lying in the
gray zone between "substance" and "procedure," thus implying that that
zone does not exist where the Rules are concerned. It did not, however,
state explicitly that this is so, leaving a question as to whether state law
can ever be applied in derogation of a Rule. Third, the Court left the
position of prior characterization doctrine in a state of uncertainty even
where the Rules are not involved, for how can one say what is left
by Hanna of the outcome test, the policy-balance test, or any other ju-
dicial gloss upon the "substantive" language of Erie? Hanna apparently4 5
barred the outcome test where the Rules are concerned, for application of
Rule 4(d)(1) clearly affected the result. It did not, however, provide
guidance where other federal law- equally supported by the Constitution
- is concerned.
At all events, Hanna's plain objective was an ouster of Erie from mat-
ters involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 46
F. Present State of Diversity Characterization: Erie/ York
in the Light of Hanna
There is little question that Hanna, despite its careful avoidance of
explicit injury to prior landmark cases, represents a turning-point in the
history of diversity jurisdiction. It is the Court's first clear move to limit
Erie's scope. Also there is little question that the reasoning employed by
the Hanna court has created much judicial uncertainty about the current
meaning and value of the Erie doctrine. That uncertainty is clearly reflected
in the opinions handed down since 1965, and was foreshadowed by Mr.
Justice Harlan in his Hanna concurrence:
I respect the court's effort to clarify the [Erie characterization]
situation in today's opinion. However, in doing so I think it has mis-
conceived the constitutional premises of Erie and has failed to deal
adequately with those past decisions upon which the courts below
relied.47
45 But see post-Hanna cases denying that this is so.
46 For scholarly comment on Hanna see, e.g., McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie
Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA.L.REv. 884 (1965). See also, an excellent note
upon the interrelationship between current diversity characterization problems
and problems of forum non conveniens, Erie, Forum Non Conveniens and
Choice of Law in Diversity Cases, 53 VA.L.REv. 380 (1967).
47 Hanna, supra note 25, at 474.
April 1968]
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To indicate the conflict in judicial views of Hanna's meaning, and the
consequent effect upon prior characterization doctrine, some of the forty-
odd cases citing Hanna are discussed below. Those involving the Federal
Rules are most pertinent, of course, and will be mentioned first. Some sup-
port Hanna fully or even extend it; others48 support the Ragan rule as
distinguishable on its facts. Some indication of judicial attitudes toward
Hanna will also be indicated, but only a reading of the cases themselves
can give a true picture of this more subjective matter.
1. Cases Involving the Federal Rules. One of the first cases following
Hanna is Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co.4 9 It involved, as did Ragan,
a clash between the tolling provision of a state statute of limitation and
Federal Rule 3.50 As in Ragan, the suit was timely filed under the Fed-
eral Rule but not under the state statute. The District Court held that the
Rule was controlling under Hanna. In so holding, the Court indicated its
belief that Hanna had overruled Ragan sub silentio. The Court concluded
that Hanna and Ragan, although differing in detail, had reached opposite
results on essentially similar facts. It said:
The principle applied in Ragan was that if "one is barred from re-
covery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal
court." . . . This principle cannot survive Hanna because admittedly
the plaintiff in Hanna was barred from recovery in the state courts.
The emphasis in Hanna is rather on the supremacy of the Federal
Rules when squarely in conflict with state law plus promotion of a
policy to prevent 'forum shopping.' 5 '
This view has been rejected by the Sixth Circuit in Sylvester v. Mess-
ler5 2 and by the Eighth Circuit in Groninger v. Davidson.5 3 Each applied
state tolling provisions instead of Rule 3 under facts similar to those in
48 See text accompanying notes 52 and 53, infra.
49 244 F.Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
50 Rule 3 provides that an action is commenced by filing the complaint, while the
state tolling provision states that the action shall be commenced for limitation-
tolling purposes only upon proper service of process. An action may therefore
be time-barred under the latter rule and not the former, if the complaint was
timely filed but service was either incorrectly made or made after the statute of
limitations had run. Those were the facts in both Ragan and Sylvestri.
51 244 F.Supp. at 527. To the same effect, see Newman v. Freeman, 262 F.Supp.
106, 111 (E.D.Pa. 1966); Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 39 F.R.D. 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (alternative ground); and Morman v. Standard Oil Co., Div. of American
Oil Co., 263 F.Supp. 911 (D.S.Dak. 1967) (The Morman court indicated its
confusion by citing Ragan and Hanna together for the proposition that "statutes
of limitation, in diversity cases, . . . are tolled, at the moment of the summons
and the complaint after filing by the clerk are delivered to the United States
Marshal for service within the time period allowed under the laws of the state
where such actions are brought." 263 F.Supp. at 912.)
52351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1101 (1966).
53 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966).
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Ragan and Sylvestri.5 4 This difference of view among the lower federal
courts seems firmly held, and its resolution may require an opinion by the
Supreme Court.
A number of other Federal Rules have been involved in diversity cases
under Hanna. In Pinewood Gin Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co.5 5
the Court allowed joinder of the plantiff's insurer under Rules 17(a) and
19(a) in an action for injury to personal property rejecting contrary state
law. The Court looked upon Hanna as precluding it from even examining
the issue of outcome-determination.
2. Cases not Involving Federal Rules. A number of diversity cases not
involving Federal Rules have also cited Hanna, but few declare it con-
trolling or even persuasive. 5 6 It is naturally in these cases that the courts
tend to indicate their doubt as to Hanna's meaning: Does it have any im-
portant influence upon cases that, unlike itself, do not involve the Rules?
One non-Rule case is Boutin v. Cumbo,5 7 where the Court actually ex-
tended the outcome test to borrowing statutes. This was a natural com-
panion extension to Ragan, for both borrowing statutes and tolling pro-
visions are designed to work in conjunction with statutes of limitation,
which are substantive under York's outcome test. In Bolick v. Prudential
Life Insurance Co.58 the forum-state statute barring incontestibility of the
life insurance policy involved in the case was inconsistent with a particular
clause in the policy. The defendant insurer argued that Hanna barred
application of the statute. The Court, unfortunately omitting to set forth
the defendant's reasoning, said: "Fortunately, this controversy unlike that
[in Hanna] ... invites no bending of the rule of Erie."59 In Anderson v.
Moorer6O the Fifth Circuit affirmed the frequently-disputed proposition that
a diversity court is merely another forum-state tribunal, saying: "This
Court sits, in a diversity action, as another Alabama court. We cannot
entertain any action not maintainable in an Alabama court, and the Ala-
bama state courts would not allow relitigation .. "61 The court in Lap-
ides v. Doner62 held that the forum-state rule against taking jurisdiction
of cases involving the internal affairs of foreign corporations was one of
venue, hence "procedural". The "guideline" built into the corresponding
federal law63 that gave the diversity court discretion to hear such cases
was applicable instead.
54 Both courts said Hanna and Ragan are distinguishable. To the same effect is O'Shea
v. Binswanger, 42 F.R.D. 21 (D. Md. 1967).55 41 F.R.D. 221 (D.S.C. 1966).
56 For dictum to the same effect, see Stone v. Terranella, 372 F.2d 89 (6th Cir.
1967).
57 259 F.Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
58 249 F.Supp. 735 (D.S.C. 1966).
;19 Id. at 739. [Italics added.]
60 372 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967).
61 Id. at 751.
62 248 F.Supp. 883 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
6328 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
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Andry v. Maryland Casualty Co.64 held that state law governed tolling
of the applicable state statute of limitations. 6 5 The Andry court so held,
despite its statement that the statute was "procedural" in a nondiversity
sense, because its application was outcome-determinative under York,
and, unlike the state service-of-process law in Hanna, it did not conflict
with a Federal Rule. The court said:
Being an action founded on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(1), this Court is bound by Louisiana sub-
stantive law, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817,
82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), and by Louisiana procedural law which is
"outcome determinative", Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945), so long as that
procedural law is not in conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.
2d 8 (1965).66
Whether the latter language in Andry draws the proper "substance-
procedure" boundary under Hanna is impossible to say at this time.
Recently, in Mull v. Ford Motor Co.,67 Chief Judge Lumbard indicated
that a policy-balancing test might be used instead of Hanna to decide the
question of whether state or federal law establishes the standard for suffi-
ciency of evidence to justify the direction of a verdict in a diversity case,
implying thereby that Hanna may be confined to "rule-clash" situations.6 S
Remember that the post-Hanna cases where Rule 3 was rejected under
Ragan in favor of state law have created a split of authority as to whether
Hanna's apparent "federal-supremacy" doctrine is applicable even where
the Federal Rules are involved. Where they are not, judicial opinion,
discussed above, indicates that prior Erie doctrine is at least partially
alive. A footnote in a recent Fourth Circuit case may be indicative. In
Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc.69 the court held that diversity courts must
apply state law to certain questions of personal jurisdiction. Then it said:
The decisions in ... [Byrd and Hanna] do not alter the Erie rationale
[that the constitution requires state-federal uniformity of judicial re-
sult in state-law cases] so as to warrant disregarding the interest of
the State in controlling the jurisdictional reach of the courts sitting
therein.7 0
64 244 F.Supp. 143 (E.D. La. 1965).
65 Rule 3 was not involved here.
66244 F.Supp. 143, 144-145 (1965).
67 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966).
68 Cf. Caso v. Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 370 F.2d 707, 709 (lst Cir. 1966).
69 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966).
70 Id. at 711, n. 11.
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This language, while in a mere footnote, indicates the Fourth Circuit's
intent to limit Hanna rather than Erie, where the former's language
permits.
Two final cases cast still further shadows upon the effect of Hanna
on existing diversity characterization doctrine. In the first, Mintz v.
Allen,7 1 the court applied the forum-state bond-posting statute in a share-
holder's derivative action under "rule-clash" facts resembling those in
Cohen.7 2 The opinion in the second case, Graziano v. Pennell,7 3 is par-
ticularly interesting because of the well-known preference of its author,
Judge Friendly, for uniform application of the Federal Rules. In Graziano,
the appellant appealed from an order dismissing his diversity action as
time-barred under forum-state law. He did so upon the ground that a sav-
ing clause in the state statute of limitation was applicable. Denying ap-
pellant the benefit of that clause, because New York courts would have
done so under the facts, and because the failure to conform would have
affected the outcome of the case in derogation of strong New York state
legislative policy, Judge Friendly said:
Although "outcome determination" analysis was never intended to
serve as a talisman, Hanna v. Plumer at 466-7, it is not to be dis-
carded but rather is to be applied with "reference to the twin aims
of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance
of inequitable administration of the laws." 380 U.S. at 468 . . . The
years have trimmed some of the dicta in Guaranty Trust v. York . . .
but the Hanna decision made clear that the core of the Guaranty case
remained unaffected .... It remains true that when no recovery on a
right created by state law could be had in a state court because the
action is effectually time barred, "the accident of a suit by a non-
resident litigant in a federal court instead of a state court a block
away, should not lead to a substantially different result." 326 U.S. at
107-9.74
Keen analyst though he is, Judge Friendly appears here to be unsure
of Hanna's effect upon Ragan.75 He is even unsure of its effect upon
York. While he says that the "core" of York was untouched by Hanna7 6
7t 254 F.Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
72 Note 30 supra. Mintz was before the court on pendent, not diversity, jurisdiction.
The fact is not significant for present purposes, however. See U.M.W. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966).
73 371 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1967).
74 Id. at 764.
75 Judge Friendly indicated this doubt in another part of the Graziano opinion, saying
"The passing of Ragan would bring no tears from us . . . and an able district
judge [Wyatt, in Sylvestri] in this circuit thinks Hanna, in fact, administered
the happy dispatch . . ." Id. at 763. [Italics added.]
76 Judge Davis of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania thinks otherwise. See Newman
v. Freeman, 262 F.Supp. 106, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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and only some of its "dicta" have been nullified, he failed to distinguish
between the two. Such distinction is necessary, for the central difficulty
with the basically sound outcome test lies in establishing reasonable
limitation on its scope.
The foregoing survey shows that a sort of battle-line is rapidly being
drawn among the various lower federal courts, with representatives of the
Hanna ideology on one side and Erie/York partisans on the other. Since
it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court will clarify matters in the near
future, or whether the diversity characterization dilemma is capable of
satisfactory judicial clarification, a legislative solution is strongly urged.
III. Difficulties Involved in Diversity Characterization:
A Summary
A. The Federal-State Power Conflict
Diversity jurisdiction in its present form has given rise to a third court
system- the diversity courts. The characterization problems that must
be dealt with by its judges changed when Erie replaced Swift, but they
did not become easier. The first of these is that diversity characterization
frequently brings state and federal law into conflict. In this connection,
however, it should be noted again that that unique form of character-
ization necessarily functions at times as a device for power allocation.
It did so in Hanna, for example, where the Supreme Court employed it
to make the federal rule-making power supreme in an area where realms
of state and federal constitutional authority overlap.
B. Unnecessary Complexities
A second difficulty is the unnecessary ramifications and complications
that can grow from what might be called the "diversity characterization
syndrome". Two sources of complexity that have been discussed recently
in scholarly journals are the doctrines of forum non conveniens r7 and the
indispensable party.7 8 The apparently inevitable interrelationship of diver-
sity characterization problems with the problems involved in each of these
doctrines creates complex, time-consuming difficulties that the litigant
should not be compelled to endure.
C. Contradictions between Diversity and Nondiversity
Characterization
"Substance-procedure" terminology in diversity cases, introduced and
compelled by Erie's critical use of the word "substance", has contributed
77 See 53 VA.L.REv. 380 (1967). See also, 1966 DUKE L. J. 1113 (1966).
78 This is especially true under amended Rule 19. See 53 VA.L.REv. 1209 (1967).
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greatly to the basic difficulty in diversity characterization. The normal use
of these familiar words is in the context of intrastate cases, where they are
employed to allocate issues between the two sets of laws adopted by each
jurisdiction, one to govern positive rights and the other to govern judicial
mechanics. Furthermore, particular issues tend to receive their usual intra-
state characterization in interstate conflict of laws matters although this
should not always occur, as different policies are frequently involved.
Considerations involved in either of these two situations differ so greatly
from those encountered in diversity characterization, however, that use of
those same words in the latter context invites both inaccuracy and un-
necessary difficulty.
The use of "substance" and "procedure" in diversity cases has fre-
quently produced different characterization from that in the state courts.
A brief list of these inconsistent characterizations will suggest the diffi-
culties involved. The following matters, usually characterized "procedural"
in state courts, are, or may sometimes be, considered "substantive" in
diversity matters:
(a) Rules regarding priviledged communications. 79
(b) Choice of law rules.8 0
(c) Rules regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel.Sl
(d) Rules regarding sufficiency of evidence to justify direction of a
verdict.8 2
(e) Rules regarding jurisdiction over subject-matter. 8 3
(f) Rules regarding jurisdiction over parties.84
(g) State statutes of limitation.8 5
(h) Tolling provisions of state statutes of limitation.8 6
79 Hill v. Huddleston, 263 F.Supp. 108 (D. Md. 1967). The Hill court qualified its
position by saying that, while a diversity court should apply state law to matters
involving privileged communication, it is not settled that Erie requires that result.
so Klaxon, supra note 23, and Sampson, supra note 36. See also, such post-Hanna
cases as Mack Trucks, Inc., v. Bendix-Westinghouse, Co., 372 F.2d 18, 20 (3d
Cir. 1966) and Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F.Supp. 671 (D. Md. 1967). For a
re-examination of fundamental considerations, read the remarks of Professor
Cavers in Change in Choice of Law Thinking and its Bearing on the Problem,
A.L.I. STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS, (Tentative Draft No. 1) at 154 (1963). Professor Cavers suggests that
the Klaxon rule may be neither constitutionally required, nor even desirable in
all cases.
SL Centennial Ins. Co. v. Miller, 264 F.Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1967).
82 Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966).83 Woods, supra note 29, and Angel, supra note 28. But see Lapides v. Doner, 248
F.Supp. 883 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
84 Caso v. Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., supra note 68, at 709; Rosen v. Savant
Instrument Inc., 264 F.Supp. 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Arrowsmith v.
U.P.I., 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
s5 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 27. See also, such post-Hanna cases as
Atkins v. Schumtz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967).
86 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., note 31 supra and the post-Hanna
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(i) Borrowing statutes.8 7
(j) Rules regarding admissibility of evidence.
(k) Rules regarding burden of proof. 8s
(1) Rules regarding competence of witnesses.
(m) Nonconclusive presumptions.8 9
(n) Rules of forum non conveniens.9 0
D. Difliculty in Formulating Standards
By the time Hanna was decided in 1965, "substance-procedure" char-
acterization had been made uncertain by the concurrent existence of three
different methods of characterization. One was normally employed by
the state courts. The diversity courts realized that abandonment of the
state standard was necessary, for characterization in diversity matters
serves a different purpose. But examination of the cases occasionally
reveals a tendency of the judges to employ the old, familiar usages of the
two ancient words, "substance" and "procedure", judges frequently forgot
that these words are mere labels that must now be attached to new
meanings.
The second method of characterization, designated for diversity matters
alone, was the outcome test announced in York.9 l The Court attempted,
without lasting success, to define the word "substantive" in terms of the
parties' principal objective in bringing their diversity cause. Its goal was to
ensure Erie uniformity by forbidding application of federal law when the
result would differ substantially from that available under state rules.
The third method was the policy-balance test of Byrd. The Court
attempted to limit York's outcome test, by holding that outcome-
determinative state law that is neither "substantive" itself nor "bound up
with" "substantive" law, will be deemed "substantive" under the outcome
test if the policy it involves is more compelling than that upon which the
corresponding, contrary, federal law is based. While Byrd has gained
many adherents, it appears to contain a basic misconception of York.
York said that "outcome-determinative" is "substantive" in the Erie sense;
Byrd merely said that outcome-determinative state laws will be applied
under some circumstances even if they are deemed "procedural" under
another, unspecified, standard.
Finally, the Supreme Court handed down Hanna v. Plumer. In Hanna,
the Court apparently intended to establish two tests: (1) a state law is
cases of Sylvester v. Messlersupra note 52, and Groninger v. Davidson, supra
note 53. But see Hanna itself.
S7 Boutin v. Cumbo, 259 F.Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
88 Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940) and Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109, 116-119 (1943). See also, such post-Hanna cases as Peterson v. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 349 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1965).
89 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Williams, 377 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1967).
90 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
91 York, supra note 27.
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"substantive" in the Erie sense if its difference from the federal law that
would otherwise be applicable may lead to forum-shopping, or if appli-
cation of that federal law would lead to "inequitable administration" of
the laws; (2) Federal Rules are always "procedural" for diversity pur-
poses, because Erie is irrelevant where the Rules are concerned, and, in
any event, the Rules have been "rationally" classified as "procedural" by
those charged with their preparation and adoption.
What is a diversity court today to make of all this?92 What test, or
tests, will it use when the application of federal v. state law is in issue?
It seems clear that the answer has not yet been found. The judges have
marched sturdily along, divided in their views of Hanna and handling each
case on an ad hoc basis. Obviously, this is not good enough. The un-
satisfactory state of the law must plainly be remedied. What seems equally
plain and considerably more important is that the Hanna doctrine of the
supremacy of the Federal Rules at the expense of powers constitutionally
reserved to the states must somehow be prevented from undermining our
constitutionally federated union.
IV. Solution of the Diversity Characterization Dilemma
A. Assumptions Underlying Proposed Solution
Certain assumptions underlie a discussion of possible ways to alleviate
or solve diversity characterization problems. The first of these is that for
diversity characterization purposes, the terms "substance" and "procedure"
have no inherent meaning. A reliable definition for use in the diversity
courts alone is a "must" if their use in that context is to continue. It is
submitted that the only way to establish such definitions is by legislation.
Second, compromise is needed if a satisfactory solution to the problems
here outlined is to be formulated and accepted. Diversity jurisdiction lies
at the vital center of our federal structure, having been established to care
for a special need created by that structure. State and federal power
zones abut in diversity causes; inevitably, they sometimes overlap. That
is to say, in deciding whether to apply federal or state law to any par-
ticular issue in a diversity case, the court may well have to invade the
one power zone or the other. This is a practical fact, whatever theory
may say. For example, application in Hanna of Federal Rule 4(d) (1)
deprived Massachusetts of its normally unquestioned right uniformly to
apply its rules regarding service of process on decedents' administrators.
On the other hand, the Ragan court barred a diversity court from apply-
ing Federal Rule 3, one of a group of rules that that court is duty bound
to employ. This overlap is illustrated by the fact that the same Court
92 The uncertainty generated by Hanna was predicted in an excellent article, McCoid,
Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA.L.REv. 884 (1965).
April 1968]
Prospectus
decided Ragan and Hanna only six years apart, holding in the earlier case
that Rules must be denied application on the ground of outcome-deter-
mination, and in the latter that outcome-determination is inapplicable
where Rules are concerned. In theory, no overlap exists; in practice, it does.
Third, the need for simplicity and reliability must be remembered in
formulating whatever test is adopted. It is probable that no acceptable
test for diversity characterization can be truly universal; but basic sim-
plicity and clarity, however, are probably within reach. Legislation seems
required to attain them, however; for one hundred and twenty-five years
of devoted and able judicial effort and experimentation have shown that
a sound and lasting solution is beyond judicial capability.
Fourth, it must be remembered that times have changed. With them,
the reasons for diversity jurisdiction have probably changed as well. Is its
principal purpose still antidiscrimination? Or is it primarily a mere con-
venience, as some recent commentators have suggested?93 Is it now
chiefly useful for experimentation or as a means for providing more ex-
pert courts than the states can muster for clients whose circumstances
require this added expertise and can generate the requisite diverse citi-
zenship? These questions must be answered before a proper solution can
be found.9 4
Finally, and most important, the rights of the litigants must be con-
sidered. Contrary to frequent judicial implications, the courts exist for
them, and not the other way around. "Procedural" rules are mere devices to
expedite the dispensation of parties' rights, not ends in themselves. The
abstract symmetry of their universal application may be appealing, but it
is irrelevant to the dispensation of justice. This point may seem obvious;
its mention was prompted, however, by a consciousness that certain very
able federal courts seem more preoccupied with the abstract desirability
of uniform application of federal law than with the rights and convenience
of those whom both courts and laws were created to serve.
B. Some Proposed Solutions for the Diversity Dilemma
There is probably no single complete and practicable solution to the
many and varied problems encountered in diversity characterization. A
compromise approach is needed, and the following short list of sugges-
tions may provide a useful idea or two for those charged with supplying the
best possible answer. They were chosen to present a spectrum of possibilities.
93 See, e.g., Wright, Field & Frank, An Analysis of the American Law Institute's Pro-
posals on the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 17
S.CAR.L.REv. 660 (1965), and particularly Mr. Frank's comments, beginning
at 677.
94 Note, incidentally, the American Law Institute's proposals to restrict diversity
jurisdiction, in its STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS, §§ 1301ff. (Official Draft, 1965). For a critical discussion of
the ALI proposals, see J. S. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and
Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317 (1967).
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Some are offered merely for contrast with more modest and realistic pro-
posals, and not in the expectation or even remote hope that they will be
adopted. Others are put forth as genuine suggestions for use in the near
future.
(1) Abolish Diversity Jurisdiction. This plan has been mooted since
the days of Swift v. Tyson, by those who feel that diversity jurisdiction
is more trouble than it is worth, and has, in any event, outlived its original
purpose. It has no chance at all of adoption, since its opponents would
include not only scholars but the federal bench, the state bench (whose
opposition would probably be based in part upon prospective inheritance
of diversity cases), and many members of the practicing bar. It would
probably require constitutional amendment. That solution would elimi-
nate at once the headaches and time-wasting futilities involved in seeking
the unattainable - a foolproof and universally approved judicial standard
for diversity characterization. It would also relieve federal district judges
of their present schizoid status as members of the "diversity bar". In so
doing, it would also take from their backs most of the burden of meting
out justice concurrently under two systems of "substantive" law, state
and federal, thus leaving them free to concentrate upon federal-question
matters. Furthermore, it would appear that the original reason for diver-
sity jurisdiction, sectional prejudice of the state courts against nonresident
parties, is a fading factor today, and is being supplanted by a simple pref-
erence for federal courts and the Federal Rules. It is doubtful if such
preferences are sufficient to justify continuance of diversity jurisdiction. If
some can have these advantages, why not all?
(2) Swift Expanded. Another solution, less extreme but also likely to
require constitutional amendment, is the adoption of an expanded form of
Swift v. Tyson - one that applies federal law in all diversity cases. 95
Combine this return to Swift with applicability of the Federal Rules under
suitable amendment of the Rules Enabling Act, and diversity character-
ization problems of consequence would be a thing of the past. All such
problems would then be decided entirely under federal law. Consider,
however, the effect of this plan upon our federal structure!
Again, this plan is suggested more for contrast than in the belief or
hope that it will be adopted.
(3) Compromise Solutions. Within the realm of practical politics, two
ideas might be suggested. First, amend the Rules Enabling Act to provide
that neither the Federal Rules, other federal law, 9 6 nor federal policy shall
be applied in diversity cases. This would leave diversity courts free to
decide all matters, both "substantive" and "procedural", under state law.
It would eliminate time-wasting and uncertain efforts to characterize, and
95 Note that no distinction is made between statute and common law in either the
diversity jurisdiction provision of Article III or the Rules of Decision Act. Never-
theless, repeal of the latter and amendment of the former would doubtless be
required.
96 With a few exceptions, such as the transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964).
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permit the diversity court to step almost exactly into the shoes of the
forum-state tribunal.
While this plan would doubtless be opposed by bench, bar, and schol-
ars as an unjustifiable inroad upon the Federal Rules, they would be less
opposed to this solution than to the complete abolition of diversity jur-
isdiction. It also presents no apparent constitutional objections.97
A second possibility would be enactment of the outcome test of Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York. One of the objections to the outcome test is its
theoretical applicability in most cases. Therefore, it would have to be
carefully limited under the rule of reason to prevent abuse. Thus limited,
it would provide a realistic and reliable guide, couched in terms of result
rather than label. This solution will not eliminate diversity characteriza-
tion problems, of course. It can, however, be supported as the one least
likely to arouse fatal opposition, yet most capable of providing a rule for
diversity characterization that is at once simple, clear and workable. Fur-
thermore, it is the only test that has proved generally satisfactory even
in its judicial form.
V. Conclusion
Diversity jurisdiction, constitutionally created as a desirable concomitant
of the legal interrelationship of states and nation created by our national
federation, has been the source of perplexing and probably unnecessary
problems. These arose from the holding of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins
and from the Rules Enabling Act which stated that district courts, when
sitting in cases involving state-created causes of action, shall apply state
"substantive" law but federal "procedural" rules. The terms "substantive"
and "procedural" have, themselves, contributed substantially to those prob-
lems because they are used in many connections other than diversity, and
necessarily have come to mean a different thing in each context. In addi-
tion, the federal court's duty to characterize for diversity purposes brings
it face-to-face with the emotionally-charged task of choosing between fed-
eral laws, and those enacted under powers constitutionally reserved to the
states. At times this choice necessarily involves actual infringement of
overlapping state or federal constitutional powers.
Most present characterization standards, particularly as they stand under
Hanna, are uncertain, mutually contradictory, and difficult to apply. In-
deed, it now appears at least possible that no judicial standards for diver-
sity characterization meeting the requirements of simplicity, clarity, and
practicality will ever be evolved. It is reasonable, therefore, to recom-
mend that Congress cut the Gordian Knot by legislatively adopting the
outcome test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. This test will be a compro-
97 This plan has already been proposed by a practicing lawyer, E. L. Merrigan, Esq.,
of the Louisiana and New York Bars, in his article, Erie to York to Ragan -
A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, in 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950).
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mise between the ideal and the attainable. Care must be exercised to
prevent its overuse at the expense of laws designed and used primarily or
entirely to govern the operation of the federal judicial mechanism. The
outcome test, thus limited, may in the end generate sufficient support to
achieve Congressional acceptance.
